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Summary The aim of this article is to conceptually delineate moral anger from other related constructs. Drawing upon social
functional accounts of anger, we contend that distilling the ﬁner nuances of morally motivated anger and its ex-
pression can increase the precision with which we examine prosocial forms of anger (e.g., redressing injustice),
in general, and moral anger, in particular. Without this differentiation, we assert that (i) moral anger remains the-
oretically elusive, (ii) that this thwarts our ability to methodologically capture the unique variance moral anger
can explain in important work outcomes, and that (iii) this can promote ill-informed organizational policies
and practice. We offer a four-factor deﬁnition of moral anger and demonstrate the utility of this characterization
as a distinct construct with application for workplace phenomena such as, but not limited to, whistle-blowing.
Next, we outline a future research agenda, including how to operationalize the construct and address issues of
construct, discriminant, and convergent validity. Finally, we argue for greater appreciation of anger’s prosocial
functions and concomitant understanding that many anger displays can be justiﬁed and lack harmful intent. If
allowed and addressed with interest and concern, these emotional displays can lead to improved organizational
practice. © 2015 The Authors Tropical Medicine & International Health Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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Don’t make me angry, you won’t like it when I’m angry.
(Bruce Banner, in The Incredible Hulk)
Anger is antisocial, unpleasant, negative, and very common
(Kemp & Strongman, 1995, p. 407)
Introduction
Anger regularly gets bad press, and the earlier quotes are a clear testament to this effect. Anger is generically deﬁned as
“a strong feeling of displeasure and usually of antagonism” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2008). Consequently,
it is not difﬁcult to understand why anger is often provided as a prime example of “negative” emotion (Barclay,
Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Tiedens, 2001; Waldman, Balthazard, & Peterson,
2011). Anger is associated with an exhaustive list of adverse if not destructive consequences in the workplace and be-
yond, ranging from aggression, violence, and bullying (Chen & Spector, 1992; Matthiesen & Einarsen, 2007; Novaco,
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1994) to ineffective leadership (Waldman et al., 2011) and deviance (Geddes & Callister, 2007; Geddes & Stickney,
2011). Indeed, many descriptions of anger circulating in psychological and management studies reﬂect this squarely.
For instance, many psychologists associate the expression of anger “with an urge to injure some target” (Berkowitz
&Harmon-Jones, 2004, p. 108, italics added). Others characterize anger as “a signiﬁcant social problemworthy of clin-
ical attention and systematic research” (Beck& Fernandez, 1998, p. 63, italics added), whileWaldman et al. (2011) gen-
eralize that anger expressions constitute a “problem” in the context of leadership studies.
We propose that these undifferentiated and negatively skewed perceptions of anger partly reﬂect what Stearns and
Stearns (1985, p. 813) refer to as emotionologies, deﬁned as “the attitudes or standards that a society … maintains
toward basic emotions and their appropriate expression; ways that institutions reﬂect and encourage these attitudes
in human conduct.” When scholars suggest that leader anger hinders attainment of their full (inspirational) leader-
ship potential (Waldman et al., 2011) and psychologists “claim that they spend more time helping clients manage
their anger than in dealing with any other emotion” (Kristjánsson, 2005, p. 679), anger appears to serve no redeem-
ing individual nor societal function and should be, wherever possible, suppressed or eradicated. Further, of particular
interest in the context of our article is the recent claim by management scholars that “reducing anger among
employees is one potential avenue for decreasing unethical behavior in the workplace” (Motro, Ordonez, &
Pittarello, 2014, p. 1, italics added).
For scholars concerned with the study of morality and justice, however, these assertions are likely to be unsatisfac-
tory. Even researchers who argue that angry individuals (minimally) are “biased decision-makers” acknowledge that
“anger, even strong anger, is not inherently dysfunctional” (Novaco, 1994, p. 21). Thus, in our quest to better under-
stand anger’s prosocial capabilities, we endorse Haidt’s (2003) view that anger is likely the “most underappreciated
moral emotion” (p. 856), and functionally—when not a lingering trait—more moral than immoral. Social functional
accounts deﬁne emotions, and especially anger, in terms of consequences of goal-directed behaviors (Keltner & Haidt,
1999). From this perspective, redressing injustice, for instance, is both a function and a consequence of anger.
In juxtaposing emotionologies with social functional accounts of anger, however, we see challenges for organiza-
tional theory, research, and practice alike. Speciﬁcally, varying anger deﬁnitions and imprecise differentiations
between antisocial and prosocial aspects of anger contribute to the construct of moral anger remaining theoretically elu-
sive and underdeveloped. Thus, the extant literature is in a state of disarray. Evidence of this is found in recent efforts to
delineate the parameters of moral anger. For instance, the label “moral anger” is sometimes used as a key construct guid-
ing empirical investigations without being deﬁned in clear conceptual terms (Master, 2009). Frequently, moral anger is
deﬁned simply as anger provoked by perceptions that a moral standard—especially fairness or justice—was violated
(Hoffman, 1989; Montada & Schneider, 1989). Elsewhere, the concept of moral anger can be so narrowly constrained
for clinical experimentation as to limit practical application outside the laboratory (Batson et al., 2007).
We identify several issues here. First, the noted brief deﬁnition of moral anger does not capture processes asso-
ciated with this prosocial form of anger in sufﬁcient depth to allow a distinct conceptual construct to emerge. For
instance, when does a violation appraisal occur and what action tendencies ensue that allow the phenomenon to
remain “moral”? Critics argue further that such a simpliﬁed, undifferentiated deﬁnition can allow individuals to
justify and apply the moniker of moral anger to anger that is only self-serving (Batson et al., 2007; O’Mara, Jackson,
Batson, & Gaertner, 2011). In addition, moral anger is often equated with moral outrage and conceptualized as part of a
“moral hostility triad” (i.e., contempt, anger, and disgust or CAD) hypothesis (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999),
suggesting moral anger can have hostile intent (Gutierrez, Giner-Sorolla, & Vasiljevic, 2012). Still others argue that
expressed anger on behalf of unfair treatment toward a signiﬁcant other does not fall under the category of moral anger,
as it is empathetic toward others’ harm (i.e., empathic anger; Batson et al., 2007). Given the degree of conceptual
imprecision in the literature, subsequent experimental manipulations may have limited applicability. In summary, the
existing confusion over what constitutes moral anger thwarts our ability to study—theoretically, empirically, and prac-
tically—anger’s more socially functional, adaptive, and fairness-enhancing components. This conceptual imprecision
may also contribute to the promotion of ill-informed organizational and societal policies and practice.
Part of the problem identifying what is moral anger stems from how scholars deﬁne the root emotion of anger.
Scholars have cautioned on the lack of sufﬁcient differentiation in terms of negative valence in emotion research
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in general (Gooty, Gavin, & Ashkanasy, 2009). Recent critiques of traditional (versus emerging) views of workplace
anger acknowledge scholars’ tendency to equate anger and its expression—even when appropriate under the circum-
stances—as a form of hostility and aggression, conﬂating the emotion of anger with both harmful intent and dam-
aging consequences (Geddes & Stickney, 2011; Lindebaum & Jordan, 2014; Stickney & Geddes, 2014).
Examples of this lack of differentiation between anger expression and aggression in terms of organizational practice
and policy exist. For instance, the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) initiated operational changes to address
organizational perceptions of “problematic” behaviors among patients and visitors. These changes are reﬂected in
recent advertising that advises patients to “choose their treatment” (i.e., medical personnel or police).1 This threat
visualized on prominent posters reﬂects a zero-tolerance policy regarding patients or clients “verbally abusing” their
staff (Welsh Ambulance Services NHS Trust, 2014). While abusive behavior should never be tolerated at work, the
NHS unfortunately does not always differentiate verbal abuse from verbal anger. Thus, angry complaints regarding
care (or lack thereof) from those concerned about their sick loved ones can potentially be labeled “assault and
abuse,” potentially prompting sanctions including the threat of withholding treatment or being arrested (NHS,
2004, 2010).
Given concerns stemming from the previous example and issues raised earlier, the aim of this article is to artic-
ulate a theoretically relevant and practically expedient social–functional deﬁnition of moral anger, while conceptu-
ally delineating moral anger from other kinds of anger or anger-related constructs that share an affective base. Moral
anger, of necessity, implies inherently positive intentions (e.g., upholding moral standards, seeking fair treatment,
and protecting those more vulnerable) and (ideally) corrective action yielding positive outcomes (e.g., moral stan-
dards are reinforced and vulnerable individuals are now better off). Nevertheless, while action readiness is embed-
ded in the affective experience of moral anger, subsequent corrective behavior itself is distinct. Thus, we argue in
this article that the act of blowing the whistle is but one possible behavioral manifestation following the experience
of moral anger. Actions stemming from moral anger, through the sense-making of individuals, can take other shapes
and forms as well.
When the term “moral” is associated with a concept, however, issues of individual and cultural value systems,
perspectives and varying standards regarding right and wrong can hinder general agreement and narrow possible
ranges of moral behavior. Thus, we seek to identify speciﬁc characteristics that facilitate the highest possible degree
of agreement for identifying moral anger. Further, the spirit in which we pursue this aim is couched in the tradition
of “normative” theories, which—unlike the Weltanschauung of empiricists and rationalists—posit that no theory is
value free (see Suddaby, 2014, for a detailed discussion). Instead, ethics and values of actors (as opposed to those of
researchers) are appreciated in management theories as an engine that constructs reality, rather than a camera that
captures it (MacKenzie, 2006). To borrow from Suddaby (2014), theory can serve various ends, and normative the-
ory may offer its own genre of theoretical claims, including examples where normative elements (such as percep-
tions of right and wrong and resultant action) form part of a construct’s deﬁnition. The key distinguishing feature
of normative theories, as alluded to earlier, is that perceptions of right and wrong are reserved for actors based upon
their ethical values, rather than pre-imposed by researchers.
In this article, we discuss the following points. First, recognizing that moral anger is a unique construct in need of
further clariﬁcation, we note distinguishing characteristics of moral emotions and speciﬁcally, moral anger, and
illustrate why this construct can logically be differentiated as a prosocial form of anger. Second, we propose a
detailed deﬁnition and elaborate on these characteristics to better distinguish moral anger from other related, but dis-
tinct, constructs (e.g., moral outrage and righteous anger), which share an affective base. Related to this is the goal of
promoting greater consistency among scholars with regard to how moral anger is construed. Third, based on the pro-
posed deﬁnition, we brieﬂy provide examples of whistle-blowing illustrative of how an individual acting out of
1This information has been retrieved from two relevant websites: (i) New campaign to tackle violence against NHS staff (2013) (Retrieved from
http://www.wales.nhs.uk/sitesplus/955/news/26261, accessed on 20 October 2015) and (ii) Your choice of treatment—Stop abuse of NHS staff
(Retrieved from http://www.healthpromotioninherts.nhs.uk/HPAC/MoreDetails.jsp?id=4679&dsn=hphertfordshire&subjectId=16&referrer=
http://www.healthpromotioninherts.nhs.uk/HPAC/BrowseSearch.jsp?subjectId=16&typeId=P&submit=true&sort=dater&page=1, accessed on
20 October 2015).
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moral anger could signiﬁcantly improve the lives of others. Finally, we highlight how a greater sensitivity toward
prosocial forms of anger can signiﬁcantly improve organizational practice and future research.
Conceptually Delineating Moral Anger
This section examines moral anger in the context of moral emotions and then demonstrates why it is useful and per-
haps necessary to distinguish it from the emotion of anger itself. Later, we discuss our conceptualization of moral
anger’s unique qualities in relation to previous efforts to delineate its parameters and other relevant constructs.
Moral emotions and anger
An assessment of morality requires that certain rules “are not the province of only a particular society… but, rather,
rules which we apply to all people everywhere and expect them to obey” (Solomon, 1993a, p. 9). In consequence,
moral rules are seen as universal, core to the moral fabric of society, and the driving force to do good and/or avoid
doing bad (Kroll & Egan, 2004). Some argue that, owing to this universal character, they are disinterested and
objective (Solomon, 1993a). This is consistent with deontological moralists, who focus primarily on motives of,
for instance, angry actors. Kant argued that moral individuals do their ‘duty’ in pursuit of ‘good without qualiﬁca-
tion’ and out of respect for their fellow human beings (Solomon, 1993a), even though he also claimed that moral
reasoning is ‘thoroughly objective.’ The moral individual is moved by a universal standard to ﬁght injustice; there
is no desire or intent to injure others, only to do or make right. Thus, moral anger would function as a tool to uphold
acceptable standards of human conduct (Averill, 1982) and, concurrently, implies a lack of intentional harm.
Our conceptualization of moral anger also is generally consistent with Haidt’s (2003) deﬁnition of moral emo-
tions, as those emotions “that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons
other than the judge or agent” (p. 853, italics added). Moral anger must be associated with something greater than
individual self-interest.2 In other words, moral anger expressions would possess “greater good” instrumentality—
where the self is not its prime or only beneﬁciary (Kelloway, Francis, Prosser, & Cameron, 2010). Thus, we argue
that moral anger incorporates an outcome orientation of moral determination. That is, anger can be viewed as moral
if others and/or social collectives are primary beneﬁciaries from its manifestation. This is also consistent with util-
itarianism as espoused by John Stuart Mill (1861/2001). Moral anger would promote favorable outcomes for society
and, ideally, be judged acceptable by the larger community (Jones, 1991). Thus, a hallmark of moral behavior and
moral emotions is a primary concern for beneﬁtting others (Haidt, 2003; Solomon, 1993a). This is well expressed in
the so-called Golden Rule (i.e., “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” Solomon, 1993). Both views
of moral determination—motives (intentions) and consequences (outcomes)—are important components of moral
anger, and both acknowledge that others’ welfare and advantage is primary.
Concurring with this dominant perspective, we nevertheless recognize that the distinction between self and other
interests does not always imply that to be moral, individuals must not personally beneﬁt or should go against their
own self-interest. Along with Krishnamurti (1992) and Mill (1861/2001), we acknowledge that individual and soci-
etal beneﬁts are often closely entwined. For instance, it might be possible that expressed anger based upon a personal
2Consistent with Solomon (1993a), we argue that drawing distinctions between disinterested and self-interested elicitors of moral emotions, es-
pecially anger, can obscure more than it reveals. Solomon notes that “moral judgment is both the product of society and one of its constituent
features. What we call our personal values are for the most part learned together and shared by a great many people” (p. 3). Taking this point
forward, he cautions that the signiﬁcance of choice in ethical debates is often mistaken with the view that individuals choose their values. This,
he insists, is misleading, adding that “most moral choices involve decisions between already-established possibilities and already-available rea-
sons” (p. 6). In other words, it is crucial to emphasize the intimate interplay between personal and societal values as we consider what makes
us angry—and what functions this can serve.
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affront can address a general moral issue in society. Thus, while we agree that one’s interests can be addressed with
moral anger, we nevertheless concur with established views that moral anger intentions and outcomes should largely
beneﬁt others.
Finally, if an individual experiences anger as a result of moral value violations, but does not express and act upon
this emotion, then we cannot speak of moral anger. Moral anger cannot remain as a mere cognitive feeling; it
necessarily prompts some form of expression and action. Rest’s (1986) four-component model for individual ethical
behavior asserts that an agent must recognize the moral issue, make a moral judgment, resolve to place moral
concerns ahead of other concerns (i.e., moral intent), and, importantly, act on the moral concerns. We attend to these
aspects in the following sections.
Moral anger versus anger
Earlier, we highlighted the tendency to equate anger with malfeasant intentions and/or destructive outcomes. For in-
stance, “anger out” is cast as an act of someone who “engages in aggressive behavior when motivated by angry feel-
ings” (Spielberger, Krasner, & Solomon, 1988, p. 95). However, we also ﬁnd efforts to deﬁne displayed anger
without a negative bias (Stickney & Geddes, 2014), including the dual threshold model’s notion of “expressed
anger” (Geddes & Callister, 2007) and the conceptualization offered by Gibson and Callister (2010). Their deﬁnition
states that anger is “an emotion that involves an appraisal of responsibility for wrongdoing by another person or en-
tity and often includes the goal of correcting the perceived wrong” (p. 68). This neutral characterization serves as an
objective starting point for scholars and practitioners interested in the causes and consequences of anger in the work-
place. However, if we contrast two very distinct scenarios, it is apparent this deﬁnition is less likely to capture the
ﬁner nuances of moral anger.
First, imagine struggling to ﬁnd a parking space for an important professional appointment in the congested City
Center. You are already late and intend to avoid further inconveniencing your colleague. Finally, you ﬁnd a vacant
parking spot and use the indicator (or turn signal) to show your goal to reverse the car into the vacant spot. However,
another car drives into the vacant spot, despite your primary position and obvious intention to use the spot. Now you
are both late and angry. A case like this falls into the category of goal obstruction as an elicitor of anger (Haidt,
2003). However, an appraisal of responsibility for a wrongdoing has occurred (i.e., he or she took my parking
space!), and the ensuing anger experienced might prompt you to approach the culprit to correct the perceived wrong-
doing (constructively or otherwise). We note that this situation aligns with Gibson and Callister’s (2010) anger
deﬁnition in terms of its appraisal processes and action tendencies. It too conforms to the deﬁnition of personal anger
as espoused by Batson et al. (2007), who note its self-oriented agenda and the potential for actions meant to punish
others in more or less responsible ways.
By contrast, a study on the link between perceptions of unfairness and anger distinguishes itself from the afore-
mentioned scenario. Raftopoulou and Lindebaum (2013) describe a situation onboard an aircraft (airborne), where
the cabin crew wrongly accused an elderly lady of “pushing” a member of the cabin crew en route to the lavatory.
Upon returning to her seat, the woman is approached by the cabin manager who sternly requests her booking refer-
ence and passport. She asserted that the woman had intentionally pushed a staff member and that the airline’s policy
did not tolerate such “rude” behaviors. Both authors—having witnessed the alleged contact—intervened as they
believed the woman experienced seriously unfair treatment and intimidation by the cabin manager. The authors’
intervention was motivated by the belief that nobody should be accused unfairly and that a stand for fair and respect-
ful treatment was imperative, especially if violated by individuals with more formal power (i.e., the cabin crew; see
Fast, Halevy, & Galinsky, 2012).
As in the ﬁrst scenario, the parameters offered in the Gibson and Callister (2010) deﬁnition of anger apply to this sce-
nario insofar as an appraisal of responsibility for a wrongdoing occurred (i.e., the authors attributed responsibility to the
cabin crew for a violation of “fair” treatment and intervened to mitigate that perceived act of injustice and intimidation).
However, the motivational force behind their action was not self-interest, but a concern for others; this, in turn, placed them
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at some risk.3 In fact, they were threatened with police involvement upon arrival, although that did not actually occur.
Contrasting these two scenarios should alert us minimally that different kinds of anger exists (Tavris, 1982). At the same
time, they also illustrate why moral anger warrants a distinct conceptualization, for its deﬁning features are clearly unique.
Moral Anger (Re)Deﬁned
Prior to offering a deﬁnition of moral anger, it is essential to draw attention to the technicalities of construct deﬁni-
tion. Suddaby (2010) stresses that novel constructs typically are built upon, or constitute an extension of, extant
constructs, as part of “an ongoing web of referential relationships” (p. 350). Among psychologists, this is typically
referred to as the nomological net or network (Cronbach & Meehl, 1995). Thus, for any psychological construct to
be of scientiﬁc utility, it must clearly capture variance, conceptually and operationally, in explaining outcome
variables not accounted for by existing constructs (Brackett & Mayer, 2003).
In addition, Suddaby (2010) argues that, as part of offering construct deﬁnitions, scholars need to be careful not to
conﬂate the processes that underlie a construct with its outcomes. In so doing, it has been argued that our own (i.e., as
researchers) value judgments can predetermine the nature of the outcome (Lindebaum & Jordan, 2012). This is an
important observation, and we concur with it in cases where scholars impose their value judgments. We noted this
in our critique of emotionologies and deﬁnitions of anger that imply harmful intentions and consequences. However,
in the tradition of normative theories, there is greater “focus on the motives and ethics of actors and the process by
which they make choices for action” (Suddaby, 2014, p. 408, italics added), instead of value-free causal logics. There-
fore, we contend that it is plausible to incorporate both the processes associated with moral anger and its intended
outcomes in our deﬁnition—as long as this puts the sense-making processes of the angry actor center stage. Thus,
having delineated fundamental characteristics of moral anger, we deﬁne it as
(i) an aroused emotional state stemming from (ii) a primary appraisal of a moral standard violation that (iii) im-
pacts others more than oneself and (iv) prompts corrective behavior intended to improve the social condition,
even in the face of signiﬁcant personal risk.
Beyond capturing a more precise theoretical framework, this deﬁnition has other beneﬁts. First, it offers ﬂexibility
in that it can pertain to one’s own direct involvement as well as witness-driven phenomena. Note that this does not,
of necessity, detract from the other versus self-interest distinction. As an individual, one may still be affected by vi-
olations of moral standards, but speaking up is undertaken with a view to defend others or the greater good, not just
to facilitate one’s own advantage. Consequently, moral anger is distinguishable from “personal anger” (i.e., anger
where one’s individual goals or interests are thwarted or harmed; Batson et al., 2007). Second, using simple present
tense allows more ﬂexibility in locating the violation and its consequences in the now and future. This is relevant as
outcomes are often the driving force behind initiating appraisals, especially when primary justice appraisals are ac-
tivated as undesired outcomes are experienced (Barclay et al., 2005). Because of the nature of violations of moral
standards, there can be an additional projection into the future—in the spirit of “this should never happen again.”
So one’s own experience can be both in the present as well as in the future. The literature on anticipatory emotions
offers further relevant insights. For instance, Baumeister et al. (2007) argue that, while emotions provide crucial
feedback in relation to one’s actions, the purpose or function of that feedback is to “learn a lesson” that provides
guidance for future behavior. Third, it allows the inclusion of events other than those rooted in perceptions of injus-
tice, although we argue that this is probably the most salient factor (Cahn, 1949). As a ﬁnal emphasis, subsequent
individual actions must attempt to correct the moral code violation, even if such efforts prove unsuccessful. This
is because individuals operate (at work and beyond) under the inﬂuence of additional factors beyond their immediate
3We recognize that expressing anger on behalf of others can put an individual at risk, and this is a central argument in the literature on moral
courage (Baumert, Halmburger, & Schmitt, 2013), which is why we include this notion in our deﬁnition of moral anger.
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control (Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, & Weick, 1970). In the following sections, we expand upon each component
of this deﬁnition with the intention of clarifying what moral anger is, and what it is not. Specially, we discuss moral
anger in relation to a nomological network of related, but distinct, constructs (see Table 1).
Emotional state
As Frijda (2007) claims, all emotions are potentially adaptive states of action readiness. To better understand moral
anger, the ﬁrst point of differentiation is to clarify this construct as state (versus trait) anger. Moral anger is unlikely
an emotional response rooted in trait anger, albeit at this stage we cannot say conclusively that it never can be. Trait
anger is a stable although typically undesirable individual disposition (Domagalski & Steelman, 2005). Those with
high trait anger report anger episodes that are more frequent, intense, and longer-lasting than those with low trait
anger (Tafrate, Kassinove, & Dundin, 2002). Further, this personality trait is often associated with hostility, verbal
abuse, leader or petty “tyranny,” and aggression (Bettencourt, Talley, Benjamin, & Valentine, 2006; Domagalski &
Steelman, 2005; Kant, Skogstad, Torsheim, & Einarsen, 2013). In such a case, anger is associated with highly self-
interested appraisals and antisocial action readiness (Haidt, 2003). Seen in this light, subsequently expressed anger
often constitutes a deﬁciency. Based upon preceding sections, we maintain that consequences associated with trait
anger are likely key drivers for negatively skewed perceptions of anger.
Table 1. Conceptually delineating moral anger from related constructs
Y = yes; N = no.
*We suggest that moral anger and personal anger are distinguishable by way of different stages in the appraisal process. To recapitulate, we sug-
gest that moral anger – based upon rapid automatic processing (Scherer, 1995) – indicates a reaction to the most pressing emotional challenges,
including those of social-evolutionary signiﬁcance, as mentioned (see Gibson and Callister, 2010). In contrast, personal anger is based upon “a
secondary appraisal of relevance, attributions, possible outcomes, goals” (Gibson and Callister, 2010, p. 71). Consistent with appraisal theories
of emotions, secondary appraisals involve more complex meanings and analyses in relation to, for instance, perceived goal obstruction, consis-
tency with norms or social standards, and fairness (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).
**Our reading of Gibson and Callister (2010) and Batson et al. (2007) suggests that personal anger often resides in the context of self-serving interests
in relation to ‘offense’ or ‘goal interference’. However, Gibson and Callister (2010) also note “that not only will individuals react with anger when
they are treated unfairly, they will also feel anger . . . when they perceive that the treatment of others, even strangers, is unfair” (p. 70).
***The work of Tripp and Bies (2010) allows for revenge (as motivated by righteous anger) to serve both self and other interests. They note that
“while the act of revenge may have served self-interest, it often serves other interests, and it is usually justiﬁed in moral terms” (p. 428).
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In contrast, moral anger is a form of state anger, an emotional condition that emerges in response to situation-
speciﬁc elicitors (Gibson & Callister, 2010). One’s emotional state of arousal may range from more mild to more
extreme levels of intensity. However, it is probable that higher levels of felt anger intensity would promote a re-
sponse to a perceived moral violation, given that intensity of feeling helps overcome inhibitions to suppress or hide
one’s anger (Stickney & Geddes, 2014). State anger is a temporary (rather than stable) human condition. Like all
emotions, moral anger is an individual’s heightened cognitive, psychological, and physiological response to speciﬁc
stimuli that remain salient for a particular period of time (Zeelenberg, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008), of-
ten until the situation is resolved. Unlike moods that have more vague triggers and longer durations, emotions
emerge quickly as we notice and evaluate a particular, relevant change in our social environment (Solomon, 1993b).
An important caveat needs to be added in relation to how emotion traits and states can interact. According to trait–
state theory (e.g., Deffenbacher et al., 1996), individuals high in a given trait are also more likely than those low in
that trait to exhibit the state form. Conceivably, individuals high in trait anger would be generally more likely to ex-
perience state anger as well. Nevertheless, we argue that moral anger would necessitate that one’s situational anger
be based on circumstances negatively impacting or harming others, not oneself. Thus, it is unlikely trait anger is cor-
related with moral anger.
Primary appraisal of moral standard violation
Frequently articulated elicitors of anger include injustice and unfairness, along with issues of interpersonal conﬂict
and goal obstruction (Geddes & Callister, 2007; Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). We
maintain, however, that moral anger reﬂects higher-order elicitors and a concomitant awareness and belief in values
and rules associated with civil society.4 It emerges when an intolerable situation accrues from violations of a moral
standard, as opposed to reacting to mere goal obstruction or personal offense. Consequently, moral anger is seen as a
“counterfactual” emotion in that it arises when an actual state of affairs is compared with more favorable and pos-
sible conditions (cf. Salovey & Rodin, 1985).
We anticipate moral anger to result from primary (versus secondary) appraisals of arousal, triggered immediately
by offensive or unjust external phenomena. Novaco (1986) sees the cognitive mediation in anger “as an automatic
and intrinsic part of the perceptual process” (p. 14, italics added). Cahn (1949) argued one’s sense of injustice is “the
sympathetic reaction of outrage, horror, shock, resentment, and anger, those affections of the viscera and abnormal
secretions of the adrenals that prepare the human animal to resist attack” and added that “nature has thus equipped all
men to regard injustice to another as personal aggression” (p. 24, italics added). Further to this, Master (2009, p. 103)
found in her qualitative study on moral anger and social activism that her participants possessed an “intrinsic knowing”
inasmuch as they “simply knew something was wrong,” in relation to, for instance, racial attitudes.
As opposed to advanced cognitive appraisals, prior studies suggest that affective reactions (which can be non-
conscious and automatic; Van Kleef, 2014) are primary when expectancy violations occur. To elaborate, experimen-
tal studies show that negative (but not positive) expectancy violations are a key determinant of affective reactions,
occurring immediately following exposure to stimuli. Bartholow et al. (2001) argue that social perceivers tend to
automatically evaluate other individuals and their behavior, including whether or not individuals conform to social
stereotypes. These affective reactions may also help explain why individuals perform better at identifying misbehav-
ior of transgressors (i.e., a social actor/agent to whom perceptions of wrongdoing are attributed, see
Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman, 2005) than other kinds of cognitive tasks. Le Doux (1996) argues that there is
“incontrovertible evidence that affective reactions could take place in the absence of conscious awareness of the
stimuli” (pp. 54–55). Automatic reactions in response to violations of moral codes are also linked to evolutionary
4We borrow the notion of “higher order” from Mill (1861/2001). He applies this notion to human pleasures to show that the pursuit of higher-
order pleasures (e.g., cultivation of an educated mind and moral sentiments) bears lower risks upon society as does the pursuit of lower-order plea-
sures (i.e., those rooted in mere bodily sensation, such as personal indulgences), for the former comes with “greater permanence, safety, and
uncostliness” (p. 15).
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advantages; here, anger is seen as a signal telling us that important moral values are being violated (see Gibson &
Callister, 2010, for a short discussion). For this reason, we propose that moral anger emerges from a primary
appraisal of stimuli as opposed to more deliberative, secondary cognitive appraisals. In other words, we argue that
moral anger’s primary appraisal is a “gut reaction” and can occur without conscious processing.
Examples of more deliberative appraisals can be found in the related constructs of indignation and righteous an-
ger, even anger itself. On the one hand, indignation represents an advanced cycle of the appraisal system, occurring
subsequent to appraisal processes of deliberation, negligence, or avoidability at the schematic meaning level (Power
& Dalgleish, 2007). Also considered a “morally grounded form of anger” (Jasper, 2014, p. 208), indignation tends to
reﬂect a more self-oriented focus with corresponding idiosyncratic standards (Solomon, 1993b). Rather than a gen-
eral sense of something amiss, there is a more conscious determination of personal affront. Moreover, in the words
of Sims (2005, p. 1627), indignation entails a “conviction of one’s own rightness and the other’s wickedness.” In the
context of work (and beyond), he also suggests different action tendencies, such as expressing indignation through
humor, while others might express it as it is felt, thereby not avoiding conﬂict. Overall, as Haidt (2003) notes, even
though anger and indignation belong to the same “emotion family” (he considers the latter the “child” of the former),
they are not identical in their eliciting conditions and action tendencies.
The construct of righteous anger, deﬁned as an “emotional response to correct and prevent injustice” (Tripp &
Bies, 2010, p. 413), is part of a growing body of research on revenge as justice (also McLean-Parks, 1997; Tripp
& Bies, 1997). Speciﬁcally, Tripp and Bies (2010) suggest that this reﬂects motivations “for revenge … grounded
in a perception that one has been the victim of undeserved harm and feelings of injustice” (p. 416, italics in original).
Righteous anger emerges when offended individuals see themselves as victims of undeserved harm and injustice and
are further motivated to use actions, such as revenge, to correct the injustice (Tripp & Bies, 2010). It too is described
as an intentional and directed response toward perceptions of harm or wrongdoing (Tripp & Bies, 2010). However,
righteous anger is not necessarily constructive and prosocial but depends on who is getting angry, what they do
about it, and who is telling the story (Potegal & Novaco, 2010). Thus, this type of response may reﬂect self-
interested action tendencies, requiring higher-order cognitive reﬂections (e.g., attributing blame; Berkowitz, 1990)
versus automated or unconscious appraisals. Thus, a clear demarcation emerges between moral anger and other
related constructs. Whereas secondary appraisals normally pertain to interpreting and ascribing meaning to an event,
moral anger as a primary appraisal more typically reﬂects the salience of an event to social well-being and funda-
mental moral values (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).
Focus primarily on others, not self-interests
This distinguishing characteristic of moral anger was introduced in our earlier discussion of what constitutes “moral”
emotions. Key for moral anger is that one’s anger, expression, and response are based more on concern for others
than oneself. To emphasize this point, we distinguish moral anger’s primarily other-oriented focus with that of righ-
teous anger, indignation, and personal and empathic anger. The previous section indicated that righteous anger can
be a catalyst for individual action that is self-protective and retaliatory in nature, in order to “even the scales of
justice” (Weiner, 2005, p. 37). Individuals see themselves as victims who are justiﬁed to pursue revengeful actions.
With indignation, subsequent anger reﬂects personal offense and pride, prompting feelings of contempt toward the
offending party. Solomon (1993b) indicates that self-righteousness occurs when individuals become convinced of
another’s “objective” guilt. This often leads the offending person and his or her behavior being viewed as inferior
or wrong while the offended, angry party consider themselves superior and their response “right.” As a life strategy
and consistent with fundamental attribution errors, individuals may avoid acknowledging personal weakness and
vulnerabilities and instead attend to the moral frailties of others (Solomon, 1993b).
Again, while moral anger, righteous anger, and indignation have some overlap, they differ with regard to the focus
of their primary interest and concern. Although angry individuals may beneﬁt from their moral anger, their salient
concern is a broader beneﬁt to others, rather than limited to self-interest. Geddes and Callister (2007) refer to this
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attribute of what observers would classify “appropriate” anger as reﬂecting an alter-centric versus ego-centric base.
Speciﬁcally, when individuals can demonstrate their anger is tied to offenses impacting others, more than them-
selves, observers of anger displays are more inclined to view expressed anger as acceptable in an organizational set-
ting. Further, Geddes and Callister (2007) also emphasize the notion of anger advocacy. Here, angry employees
approach supportive conﬁdants who then act as advisors, coaches, or even personal advocates on behalf of their col-
leagues to help address problematic work situations. In these instances, they argue that organizational members
“who act as advisors, advocates, and/or surrogates … increase the probability of more positive than negative out-
comes” [in the workplace] (p. 728).
Research attempting to distinguish moral anger or moral outrage (sometimes used interchangeably in the literature)
from personal anger clearly shows that the latter emerges “when one’s own interests are thwarted… or one is treated
unfairly” (Batson et al., 2007, p. 1273; but see also O’Mara et al., 2011). Unfortunately, individuals attempt to label
this (by deﬁnition) self-serving, personal anger as a moral emotion in order to gain legitimacy and perhaps supporters.
However, often the goal is less about restoring fairness and more about protecting one’s own interests and, in some
cases, seeking revenge or restoring one’s honor (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996). In contrast to personal
anger, differentiating moral anger from empathic anger appears, at least initially, less clear-cut. Batson et al. (2007)
introduced the concept of empathic anger as the emotion felt when the interests of a “cared-for” other are thwarted.
Conceivably, because one is not personally impacted, this could reﬂect the “focus on others” requirement for moral
anger. However, it is argued that such empathetic responses are not based on an assessment of a moral standard
violation as much as simply a signiﬁcant others’ own interests (Batson et al., 2007). While we would argue strongly
that felt empathy and/or compassion, regardless of beneﬁciary, likely affects one’s ability to experience moral anger
(Hoffman, 1989; Montada & Schneider, 1989), in its current conceptualization as proposed by Batson et al. (2007),
empathic anger is seen less as a response to fairness standards violation, and more focused on acknowledging and
addressing harm caused to someone with whom one is afﬁliated.
Prompts corrective behavior intended to improve the social condition
It has been argued that the two most widely studied types of social behavior are helping and harming behavior (Lee &
Allen, 2002). Logically, organizations are better off when helping is optimized and harming is minimized. Moral
anger, as deﬁned here, serves to avoid harm while improving upon or removing a fundamentally unacceptable situation.
Thus, prompting helping behavior, moral anger attempts to reconcile disparity, repair damaging situations, restore
equity, and, in general, improve the human condition. In this respect, Adams (1995) shares the following observation:
If anger is not guided by the optimism of vision and clear humanistic values, it can be diverted into desperate and
anti-human activities. The enemies of peace and justice often try to exploit anger in order to divert movements
into such desperation (p. 17).
Important to the anger/aggression distinction reinforced in this article, Adams is also explicit that anger, thus con-
ceived, “is not the same as violence” (p. 18). His observation is both consistent with, and lends further substance to,
our deﬁnition of moral anger. However, there is a large body of research focused on behavior meant to harm, such as
aggression (Baron & Richardson, 2004). Even indignation has been associated with a desire “to punish” (Solomon,
1993b, p. 271). To elaborate, aggression is deﬁned as “any form of behavior directed toward the goal of harming or
injuring another living being who is motivated to avoid such feeling” (Baron & Richardson, 2004, p. 7). In the
context of the workplace, aggressive behaviors are said to take three distinct manifestations: (i) overt aggression
(e.g., physical assault or violence); (ii) verbal and/or symbolic expressions of hostility (i.e., verbal abuse or gestures);
and (iii) obstructionism (e.g., withholding efforts or information to impede progress of others; Skarlicki, Folger, &
Tesluk, 1999). Baron and Richardson (2004) argue that, while emotions and attitude can play a role in the occurrence
of behavior that causes harm, their presence as such is not a precondition for the enacting of such behaviors.
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In relation to moral outrage, while it is also said to be a “potent source of moral motivation, prompting efforts
to restore fairness and justice,” the subsequent reference to achieving this “either by compensating the victim or
by punishing the harm-doer” (Batson et al., 2007, p. 1272) sets it apart from moral anger advocated here in two
meaningful ways. First, compensation implies that a moral transgression is accepted as a given and that ways are
found to make the situation more tolerable for the victim. Moral anger, by contrast, seeks to correct the moral
transgression here and now as well as in future, as explained earlier. Second, moral anger lacks the desire
for intentional harm (e.g., punishment and vengeance) toward the harm-doer. Moral outrage, by contrast,
implies a high level of intensity (i.e., “rage,” which suggests more potential to damage or harm). In summary,
given that all these anger-related constructs have an inherent “intent to harm” motivation, none can be construed as
moral anger.
Our conceptualization of moral anger proposes that one’s intentions behind the action to correct a moral violation—
not one’s actual (or perceived) success—constitutes moral anger’s connection to subsequent action. Determining
whether someone’s actions actually succeed in correcting moral violations is not always straightforward due to varia-
tions in individuals’ judgments and perceptions. However, one potential way to assess the relative “success” of moral
anger expression comes from the work of Near andMiceli (1995) on effective whistle-blowing and associated criteria to
gauge the “reasonableness” of its consequences. In other words, did whistle-blowing lead to more favorable outcomes
for others who had previously been negatively impacted; that is, are people better off as a result of this action? Further, it
seems reasonable that the more beneﬁciaries there are, the more we can speak of expressions of anger as morally and
socially functional. For instance, did the act of whistle-blowing—as motivated by moral anger—initiate changes in
relevant legislation, so that, for example, relevant authorities exercise closer control over medical trials leading to
the approval and use of new medical drugs? As the recent case of a pharmaceutical contract research organization
shows, their fabricated drug test results potentially put the lives of many patients at risk. Across Europe, several
relevant authorities have suspended marketing approval over concerns about clinical trials conducted by the
contract research organization as a result of the whistle-blower’s actions (Burger, 2014). In this case, at-risk popula-
tions globally appear to have beneﬁtted substantially. In another example, public opinion that once cast an individual
or a small group of individuals as “emotional deviants” (Thoits, 2004) now has come to terms that these individuals
—due to their perceptions of injustice—played a crucial role in the transformation of others into necessary “counter-
normative peer groups” to help initiate the redressing of injustices (Thoits, 2004). For instance, the activist and retired
professor Angela Davis, once branded a “terrorist” by President Nixon, is now viewed as a moral authority on racial
discrimination (Jeffries, 2014).
In summary, having deﬁned and provided detailed background on moral anger, we propose that moral anger is
potentially a cumulative phenomenon in the sense that some anger expressions may be viewed as more moral than
others. The more anger expressions reﬂect the four characteristics discussed previously, the more likely it can be
viewed as moral anger. We illustrate the conceptual delineation of moral anger from other anger-related constructs
in Table 1. Note that perceptions of wrongdoing mark the starting point for each construct, with the four
distinguishing characteristics of our moral anger deﬁnition revealing distinct variations among the concepts under
review. In the following section, we apply our deﬁnition of moral anger to the literature on whistle-blowing—as
one type of behavior prompted by moral anger—to highlight its conceptual utility.
Examining whistle-blowing as a consequence of morally motivated anger
The whistle-blowing literature offers manifold examples to which we can pertinently apply the lens of moral anger
to either predict different courses of action (e.g., other than those predicted by aggression or simple inaction) or as a
verifying tool to show that morally angry individuals can enact prosocial behaviors consistent with our conceptual-
ization of moral anger to improve a given situation. Whistle-blowing has been deﬁned as “the disclosure by organi-
zation members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers,
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to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action” (Near & Miceli, 1995, p. 680). The act of whistle-
blowing is most often an act that facilitates exposure of illegal, unethical, or morally questionable acts that may
go against the values of the organization as well as civil society (Miceli & Near, 1988). We offer three brief
examples of whistle-blowing to illustrate where an individual’s moral anger (i) might have prevented human
tragedy, (ii) may or may not produce sufﬁcient beneﬁcial societal outcomes to ultimately warrant this designation,
and (iii) identiﬁed unethical practices that changed an industry.
In the presence of moral anger, we envisage the following case to potentially have taken a different course of ac-
tion. Speciﬁcally, consider the radiation experiments secretly undertaken by the U.S. Department of Defense on both
soldiers and civilians during the late 1940s and early 1950s (Nielsen, 1996). These experiments exposed humans to
varying degrees of radiation, and often without obtaining consent or informing research subjects on the signiﬁcant
risks involved. While there was considerable debate and opposition against these experiments among the scientists
involved, several of them “obeyed orders, cooperated, and did not blow the whistle” (Nielsen, 1996, p. 16). This
was, in large part, because the Department of Defense classiﬁed the relevant documentation on and around the
experiments as “secret” to avoid adverse public debates and potential lawsuits. At that moment in time, the scientists
were driven by fear of penalties for breaching the military’s conﬁdential classiﬁcation. Thinking the risk of whistle-
blowing was too high, the scientists’ decision not to pursue the issue allowed the unethical experiments to continue
until 1953.
As a more contemporary example, consider the still-pending case of Edward Snowden. There is considerable
divergence in public opinion as to whether it was right or wrong to blow the whistle on the (for him, unlawful) sur-
veillance activities of the U.S. intelligence services. However, commentators suggest that his anger (Holings,
interviewed by Hinson, 2013) stemmed from the perception of unjust and illegal governmental practices. More spe-
ciﬁcally, some note that “behind his quiet, unassuming surface, his … anger with his employers was growing”
(Harding, 2013, cited in Moretti, 2014, pp. 845–846, italics added). Further to this, in a letter to the German MP
Christian Ströbele dated 31 October 2013, Snowden asserts he was compelled out of a “moral duty” to act against
“systematic violations of law” and that his concern was geared toward “upholding the international laws that protect
us all.”5 As we noted in our deﬁnition of moral anger, one’s actions must be viewed as ultimately beneﬁcial to
society in general, possibly putting oneself at some risk, to be classiﬁed as moral anger, and to date, Snowden’s
personal account and current status reﬂect this.
Perhaps less contentious are examples of corporate whistle-blowing, such as the infamous case of U.S. Tobacco.
This celebrated instance clearly shows that individuals appalled by corporate practices can enact prosocial behaviors
consistent with our conceptualization of moral anger. Nevertheless, selﬂess actions meant to help society may re-
quire signiﬁcant risks—both professionally and personally. For instance, in 1996, Jeff Wigand, then Vice President
of Research and Development at Brown and Williamson Tobacco and responsible for developing reduced-harm cig-
arettes, blew the whistle that his company intentionally increased the amount of nicotine in their cigarettes, thereby
enhancing its addictive nature. As part of his (initially) internal challenges, he reported being harassed and receiving
anonymous death threats. His situation was portrayed in the 1999 ﬁlm, The Insider. In a 1996 interview by Mike
Wallace of CBS 60 Minutes, Wigand stated that he “got angry” about the company’s decision to abandon the safer
cigarette, although he did not blow the whistle at that time.6 Once he did ﬁnd the courage to speak up, his whistle-
blowing brought signiﬁcant danger to him and his family but also contributed to the exposure of unethical practices
by U.S. tobacco companies. Ultimately, Wigand’s actions beneﬁtted potentially millions who would have been
exposed to this especially harmful but legal product.
In light of these examples, we concur with Tavris (1982), who posits that there may be many mundane (or extraor-
dinary) incidents when individuals angrily take a stand for what they deem is right at work and in a democratic, just
society. In so arguing, we recognize that moral anger is always expressed (versus suppressed) anger that may be
5The letter can be retrieved from the BBC website. Please follow this link: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/snowden-brief100%5B1%
5D.pdf, accessed on 20 October 2015. Should this link not be operational in the future, please request a copy from the ﬁrst author.
6The full transcript has been retrieved from http://www.mcspotlight.org/beyond/cbstranscript.html, accessed on 20 October 2015.
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displayed in the form of facial expressions, tone of voice, and non-harming behaviors. More broadly, we recognize
that moral anger would energize (cf. Lindebaum & Gabriel, 2015) individuals to act in restorative ways for the
betterment of others (i.e., coworkers, clients, and communities) adversely impacted by violations of moral codes,
even though the entity or person responsible may never be faced personally. Regardless of one’s success, moral
anger reﬂects one’s desire to speak up and do something on behalf of others and for the betterment of civil society
and their respective organizations.
Our examples alert us to what can happen in the absence and presence of moral anger. If we apply our concep-
tualization of moral anger, it only takes one courageous individual to blow the whistle and help generate public mo-
mentum that contributes to the cessation of illegal and unethical practices—many of which, if allowed to continue,
could lead to human tragedy. Of course, the personal risk involved in disclosing information that an organization
wants desperately to remain private has undoubtedly contributed to “many good [and angry] people doing nothing,”
to borrow sentiments from Edmund Burke (Bromwich, 2014, pp. 175–176). We are nevertheless encouraged that in
the U.S.A. and other countries (e.g., the U.K.), relevant legislation encouraging and protecting whistleblowers has
advanced signiﬁcantly in recent years. Examining whistle-blowing as an example of moral anger helps us better un-
derstand how perceptions of injustice and violations of social norms motivate behavior seen as improving the social
condition, even in the face of personal risk.
Future Research on Moral Anger
We have proposed that moral anger is an explicit and distinct construct whose conceptual parameters are in need of
clearer delineation. As such, we have maintained this reﬁned construct has signiﬁcant potential to enrich future the-
orizing, empirical testing, and organizational practice. Having laid theoretical groundwork, we recognize the need to
pursue ways to operationalize or investigate moral anger in organizations (Cooper, 1982). With this goal, we envis-
age at least three avenues.
First, for researchers favoring the laboratory setting as a means of gathering data, it would be useful to design spe-
ciﬁc vignettes (or emails, e.g., Johnson & Connelly, 2014), whose wording is unambiguously and consistently
guided by, and rooted in, the proposed deﬁnition of moral anger. A second approach to operationalize moral anger
is the design of a speciﬁc psychometric instrument to assess self or others’ perceptions of moral anger (depending on
the exact aim of a study). Authoritative reviews on the topic are well established (Clark & Watson, 1995;
Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). As a starting point, in our deﬁnition, we propose four key factors of moral anger
for which researchers could develop preliminary items: (i) an aroused emotional state; (ii) primary appraisal of moral
standard violation; (iii) impacting others more than self; and (iv) prompting corrective behaviors intended to im-
prove the social condition, even with the possibility of signiﬁcant personal risk. Further, we suggest moral anger
could be distinguished as a “cumulative effect” of all four variables, whereas other examples of prosocial or morally
motivated anger (e.g., empathic anger or moral outrage) would reﬂect fewer characteristics (Table 1).
As a novel construct, moral anger must also demonstrate construct validity. Anastasi and Urbina (1997) de-
scribe construct validation as a process of evaluating whether a given test actually measures some theoretical con-
struct or trait. Such process seeks, inter alia, to determine whether the instrument assesses empirically what it
purports to measure theoretically and employs statistics such as exploratory (and, ultimately, conﬁrmatory) factor
analysis (Huck, 2004). Table 1 should help establish discriminant and convergent validity (Campbell & Fiske,
1959) as we attempt to differentiate moral anger from other distinct, anger-related constructs (i.e., personal anger,
righteous anger, empathic anger, indignation, and moral outrage). To this end, consistent use of terminologies is
required. Relatedly, although even the most precise measure of moral anger will, of necessity, show some overlap
with measures of other forms of anger given their shared affective base, we recognize that underlying common
variance should not detract from establishing discriminate validity. Therefore, we do not know yet whether, at this
formative stage, traditional exploratory and conﬁrmatory factor analyses are effective in establishing discriminant
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validity. We recognize the possibility that many of the common “rules of thumb” in relation to cross-loadings and
model ﬁt that are applied to these analyses might indicate a lack of discriminant validity among the different
forms of anger—no matter how well-designed the measures are. Therefore, we suggest that this can signal a lim-
itation of the analytical procedures, but not of the construct itself. In such a case, we recommend either to relax
the aforementioned rules of thumb or to focus upon incremental predictions of moral anger. For instance, for
moral anger to qualify as a novel construct, it must explain variance in important work or life outcomes not
accounted for by existing constructs. At a minimum, we argue that moral anger could be used to examine
prosocial forms of anger that promote urgently needed change, enhanced dialogues and discussion, and challenges
to unethical and illegal practices. Other potential dependent variables around which speciﬁc propositions could be
articulated include engagement in challenging authority or the status quo, prosocial dissent, whistle-blowing,
social activism, advocacy, disposition to defend free speech, altruistic behaviors that carry personal risks, and
acting against inequalities in access to justice or resources.
Finally, we propose that the deﬁnition of moral anger provided here can also serve qualitatively inclined scholars as
a guide to structure and formulate interview questions. This may be of particular interest in cases when and if, as
hinted earlier, statistical analyses fail to delineate moral anger from other anger-related constructs. Again, this may
not be an issue with the construct as such but rooted in the limitations of the statistical procedure. Recent studies show
how insightful the eliciting of lived experiences in relation to anger in the workplace can be (Lindebaum, Jordan, &
Morris, 2015).
As ongoing scholarship further validates or investigates this construct, we envision various studies that could be
pursued. For example, given the signiﬁcant number of studies linking trait anger and negative affectivity with unfa-
vorable, anger-related workplace outcomes (Thoresen, Kaplan, Barsky, Warren, & de Chermont, 2003), more re-
search examining moral anger and positive workplace outcomes could examine moral intensity and individual
traits such as positive affectivity (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). For instance, it has been proposed that an is-
sue’s “moral intensity” can promote a higher recognition of ethical issues and ethical behavior (Master, 2009). It
might be that moral intensity moderates occurrences of moral anger at work or in society, in general. Some initial
research on expressed anger also suggests that an individual’s positive affectivity, more than negative affectivity,
determines whether or not individuals express anger at injustices and to individuals best suited to address the
problem (Stickney & Geddes, 2014).
Service and work relationships that may include client anger expressions are additional opportunities to exam-
ine moral anger, for instance, in relation to “communal motivation” (i.e., the degree an individual wishes to be
responsive to a relationship partner and assume responsibility for their welfare; Mills, Clark, Ford, & Johnson,
2004). For example, Yoo et al. (2011) found that individuals classiﬁed as having “low communal motivation”
judge angry partners more negatively, provide lower support, and have lower relationship satisfaction compared
with those with high communal motivation. Applied to service providers in the healthcare industry, for instance,
those (e.g., nurses) most interested in patient well-being might have more positive reactions to their expressed
emotions (i.e., they would be less likely to view anger expression by patients, for example, as abusive) and be
more inclined to withhold offense or negative judgment to better understand and address client needs. Thus,
we anticipate that employees with high communal motivation and/or positive affectivity might be more able to
distinguish justiﬁable and moral anger and be more likely to exhibit it themselves when confronted with
organizational injustices and improprieties.
We also envision that a range of concepts, such as optimism, empathy, altruism, and courage, could be examined
in relation to moral anger as a relevant phenomenon that can promote more supportive, just, and honorable work
environments. Future research also could explore the frequency and timing of when the effects of moral anger ex-
pression in the context of work manifest themselves. Importantly, we stress that even a single occurrence of moral
anger can make all the difference in redressing acts of injustice. This features prominently in the literature on social
movement (e.g., Jasper, 1998, 2014), alerting us to the fact that individual moral anger can also morph into a group-
level phenomenon. These examples of future research are provided to reiterate that we see moral anger as a unique,
prosocial component in the wider nomological network of anger and anger-related constructs. At this juncture,
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however, we recognize that this article simply lays the groundwork for further, signiﬁcant research aimed at concep-
tual reﬁnement and practical application.
Recognizing Justiﬁable and Prosocial Forms of Anger in Organizations
Ghoshal (2005) once observed that “since morality … is inseparable from human intentionality, a precondition for
making business studies a science has been the denial of any moral… consideration in our theories and, therefore, in
our prescriptions for management practise” (p. 77). We posit that the acuity of his observation has grown in signif-
icance in recent years as a result of emotionologies that increasingly cast organizational anger expression as deviant,
harmful behavior (Lindebaum & Jordan, 2014). As a consequence, organizational efforts to eliminate whistle-
blowing as well as other forms of appropriate, morally justiﬁable emotional expression at work can in truth conceal
unethical and unjust practices that put individuals, organizations, or the environment at risk. Having argued that
prosocial forms of anger, including moral anger, serve important roles in maintaining civil society, we come full cir-
cle back to the proposition that allowing morally motivated anger expression in organizations can serve as a tool of
organizational diagnosis to better our individual and collective behaviors (Lindebaum & Gabriel, 2015), including
more just treatment of relevant stakeholders and populations.
Let us brieﬂy revisit the case of the NHS in the U.K. We offer this analysis as a cautionary tale of potential prob-
lems in decision making and policy formation when organizations do not differentiate justiﬁed and even morally
motivated anger expression from verbal assault and abuse. Simply put, workplace anger displays often signal prob-
lematic situations (including policies, employees, or conditions) that need attention in order to improve
customer/patient service and conﬁdence in the organization and its staff. Confusing morally motivated anger with
verbal assault or abuse can stigmatize and invariably suppress important information about workplace conditions
and treatment that could, in reality, beneﬁt future services, operations, and patients. For instance, when the NHS
asked staff to report non-physical assault, they provided two categories: “verbal abuse, excluding verbal threats
of physical violence” and “verbal threats of physical violence” (NHS, 2010, p. 91, see footnote no. 12). Asking sur-
vey respondents to identify verbal threats of physical violence is fairly clear and straightforward. However, the term,
“verbal abuse” is used increasingly by the lay community to describe any intense or intrusive verbal action one
would prefer not to experience, rather than its actual deﬁnition of demeaning, injurious, and untrue statements meant
to cause emotional and psychological distress. Interestingly, primary causes of “verbal abuse” listed by NHS staff
overwhelmingly included the patient’s own mental health condition. Related causes of verbal or physical abuse
(undifferentiated in a second study report; NHS, 2010) reported by staff included numerous factors related to
NHS information, operations, and facilities, including the following: (i) length of time waiting to be seen by a health
professional; (ii) problems understanding information/instructions; (iii) dissatisfaction with services/treatment; (iv)
concern about their condition; and (v) concern about another patient’s condition (NHS, 2010).
Overall, with the NHS example, our contention relevant to moral anger and all forms of prosocial anger is two-
fold. First, failing to differentiate anger expressions from verbal abuse and assault can reinforce the inaccurate,
although common belief that all displayed anger is hostile, aggressive, and violent; in other words, all anger is
viewed as having no social or redeeming value in organizational settings. Second, often, one’s anger is clearly
justiﬁable. Thus, when a family member advocates vehemently on behalf of their suffering or mistreated relative,
it can function as a diagnostic tool to identify faults, limitations, and weaknesses in organizational processes and
employee practices. Consequently, information gleamed from angry clients and their families can promote greater
dignity, assistance, and kindness toward a particularly vulnerable population.7
7We have retrieved the above NHS information from publicly available sources. To what extent NHS staff actually follow or enact these policies,
or whether all NHS staff are aware of these policies, is something we cannot establish here.
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For this possibility of better service and functioning, however, organizations need to widen (not compress) their “zone
of expressive tolerance” (Fineman, 1993). This increased individual and organizational degree of freedom for emotion-
triggered communication practices can create a greater civic space for ethics to operate (Ricoeur, 1991), where employees
attempt to better understand and address the source of anger at injustice or indignities (i.e., moral anger versus simple goal
frustration) and to engage constructively in conﬂict resolution required to create a better situation than before.We are both
encouraged and sobered by recent studies showing that expressed anger predicts perceived improvement with problem-
atic situations at work, while suppressed anger induced perceptions that the situation at work deteriorated (Stickney &
Geddes, 2014). Thus, sometimes, it can be good to feel bad at work (Lindebaum& Jordan, 2014), especially if that means
allowing client anger displays that address inappropriate, unjust, or disrespectful actions or practices.
Conclusion
In this article, we challenge ongoing beliefs in society and organizations alike that anger is always bad, deviant, and
even dangerous. Instead, we assert that anger has important prosocial forms that need to be better understood and, at
least, allowed because they help us identify and address problematic situations in work and beyond. In particular, we
offer an explicit and reﬁned conceptual deﬁnition of moral anger and delineate various types of anger-related con-
structs to better distinguish this “highest form” of socially functional anger. We address the current confusion and
disarray over what constitutes moral anger and suggest this limits the way we theorize about and advocate for this
type of anger at work and in society. Our hope is that future theoretical, empirical, and practical efforts to examine
and incorporate moral anger in the broader domain of psychology and management studies can recognize its vital
role in sustaining just and fair workplaces and societies.
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